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671d. at 1733. 71 See Walton v. Arizona, 110 S. Ct. 3047 (1990) (a crime is
committed in an especially "cruel" manner when the perpetrator inflicts
68 Id. mental anguish or physical abuse before the victim's death. A murder is
committed in an especially "depraved" manner when the perpetrator
69 Riner v. Commonwealth, 145 Va. 901, 134 S.E. 542 (1926). eitherrelishes the murder, evidencing debasement orperversion, or shows
indifference to the suffering of the victim and evidences a sense of
70 See Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-399 (1991). (this statute is applicable if pleasure in the killing) see also the narrowing constructions given in
the defense files a motion to prohibit the imposition of the death penalty Godfrey v. Georgia at n. 12 of this article.
challenging the Virginia death penalty, prior to filing its motion for a bill
of particulars.)
THE VIRGINIA SUPREME COURT AND THIRTEEN YEARS
OF DEATH SENTENCE REVIEW
BY: ANNE E. MCINERNEY
In 1978, in Smith v. Commonwealth1, the Virginia Supreme Court
affirmed the sentence of the first defendant sentenced to death under
Virginia's capital murder statute enacted in response to Furman v.
Georgia.2 In 1972, in Furman, the United States Supreme Court had
declared that capital punishment, as then administered, was unconstitu-
tional. In the thirteen years since Smith, the Virginia Supreme Court has
had occasion to say a lot and has denied relief on automatic review and
appeal of right in the vast majority of cases.
This piece discusses thehistory of deathpenalty law in Virginiasince
Furman v. Georgia and outlines the Virginia Supreme Courts initial
interpretations of the State's modem capital murder statute in Smith. The
article then examines the development of the law of default and waiver,
the construction and reach of the capital statute, the definition of and range
of relevant evidence going to the aggravating factors, mitigating evidence,
and the selection process of the capital jury since Smith.
The article then considers Virginia's statutory requirement for
automatic review of the death sentence and discusses the possible effects
of the United States Supreme Court's 1983 holding that proportionality
review is not constitutionally required. Despite the statutory requirement
for automatic review, and the constitutional right to meaningful appellate
review, the Supreme Court of Virginia has affirmed almost every death
sentence since 1978. The article contains abrief summary of the few cases
where the supreme court has granted relief.
Virginia's capital murder statute is modeled after the Texas statute
approved in 1976 by the United States Supreme Court in Jurek v. Texas.
3
This article contains a brief comparative look at the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals and some of the cases decided by that court. The article
concludes with some observations about the present status of capital
penalty law in Virginia and offers several remedial tactics for use by
Virginia defense counsel.
Furman v. Georgia and Virginia's Response
In 1972, in Furman v. Georgia, the United States Supreme Court
concluded that capital punishment, as then administered under statutory
systems which permitted unbridled discretion, violated defendants' eighth
amendmentprotection againstcruel and unusual punishment as well as the
fourteenth amendment due process and equal protection clauses. 4 In
response, two-thirds of the states, including Virginia, which has had a
death penalty statute since 1796, began crafting capital murder statutes
which sufficiently limited jury discretion and avoided arbitrary and
inconsistent results. In 1976, the Supreme Court struck down North
Carolina and Louisiana statutes which had mandatory death penalty
provisions for certain crimes but upheld statutes in Florida, Georgia, and
Texas because each of those states had provided adequate standards to
guide the exercise of the jury's sentencing discretion.5
In 1977, using the Texas statute found constitutional in Jurek v.
Texas as a guide, the Virginia General Assembly enacted the capital
murder statute substantially as it stands today. All of the approved statutes,
including those of Texas and Virginia, provide for automatic review of death
sentences. Most, including Virginia's but not Texas', require the reviewing
court to consider whether the punishment is disproportionate to that imposed
insimilarcases. Alsoin Virginia, butnot inTexas, every capital defendant has
an appeal of right directly to the state supreme court rather than to the court of
appeals, usually the first level of the appellate process. When a defendant in
Virginia makes an appeal of right to the supreme court, this appeal is
consolidated with the automatic review of the death penalty and advanced on
the docket for an expeditious process.
In the Beginning: Smith
A trial jury convicted Michael Smith under the rape-murder subsec-
tion of the new capital murder statute in 1978.6 The Supreme Court of
Virginia upheld his conviction and death sentence in Smith v. Common-
wealth.7 The court consolidated the defendant's appeal of right and
automatic review of sentence8 Smith raised multiple issues in his appeal,
which fall into five broad categories: pre-trial proceedings, the guilt trial,
constitutional challenges to the capital murder statute, the penalty trial,
and the propriety of the penalty imposed. 9
Smith assigned error to the trial court's exclusion of ajuror for cause
related to her predisposition against capital punishment. The court stated
on review that, in line with Witherspoon v. Illinoislo and its progeny, the
question of whether a venireman should be excluded turns upon the
question whether, in fact, he is "irrevocably committed" to vote against the
deathpenalty. Relying on footnote 9 of the Witherspoon opinion, the court
held that "absent an unambiguous statement of absolute objection, the
trial judge cannot assume absolute objection." Under the Witherspoon
holding and the corollary note, "'general objections' to capital punish-
ment are not constitutionally sufficient to justify the exclusion of a juror
for cause; nothing less than an absolute objection ... to vote against the
deathpenalty, wilsuffice."1 Whilethetrialcourt notedthat theexcluded
juror's responses to questions during voir dire were sometimes inconsis-
tent, it nevertheless concluded that "life [was] all she'd ever give" and
discharged her from the jury panel.12 On review, the supreme court held
that while it could not say that such a finding of fact was unmistakably
clear, the ruling did not contravene Witherspoon.
13
Smith also challenged the Virginia capital murder statutory complex
under which he was convicted and sentenced. The court responded with
a full explanation of the four proceedings which it must conduct before it
may deliver a sentence of death. The court conducts three evidentiary
hearings. In the first, the jury determines guilt or innocence and may
convict the defendant of the crime charged or a lesser-included offense. If
the jury convicts the defendant of a class 1 felony, the jury determines in
the second phase whether the penalty should be death or life imprison-
ment. The jury may hear aggravating evidence concerning circumstances
of the offense and the history and background of the accused.
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Code § 19.2-264.4(C) provides that the death penalty shall not be
imposed unless the Commonwealth proves one of two statutorily-pro-
vided factors in aggravation of the offense. The Commonwealth must
prove beyond a reasonable doubt either that there is a probability that the
defendant would commit acts of violence that would constitute a continu-
ing serious threat to society, or that his conduct in committing the crime
was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman, in that it involved
torture, depravity of mind or an aggravated battery to the victim. 14 Under
the language of the section, the jury can recommend a sentence of
imprisonment for life even when the Commonwealth establishes either or
both aggravating circumstances (although this fact may not be clear to
most jurors). A jury recommendation of life in prison is binding on the
court.
The jury may also hear facts in mitigation of the offense. Five
mitigating circumstances are listed for illustrative purposes but are not
meant to be exclusive.
Smith argued that the Commonwealth's instructions on imposition
of the death penalty failed to adequately advise the jury that, even though
it may find aggravating circumstances, thedeath penalty is notmandatory.
The court held that the instructions, although inartfully drawn, told the
jury that it "may fix... punishment at death," and that what ajury "may"
do it is at liberty not to do. 15
When the jury recommends the death penalty, the trial court inves-
tigates the history of the defendant and other relevant facts. 16 A copy of
the report must be made available to the defendant at least five days before
it is presented in open court, and the defendant is guaranteed the right to
cross-examine the investigating officer and the right "to present any
additional facts bearing upon the matter which he may desire to present."
At the conclusion of this third hearing, if the trial court determines that the
death penalty is not appropriate, it may set aside the sentence of death and
impose a life sentence.
If the trial court affirms the death sentence, the defendant is entitled
to an appellate review of the sentence as a matter of fight, and the review
is accorded priority on the docket. In the course of this fourth proceeding,
this court makes two determinations-whether the sentence was imposed
under the influence of passion, prejudice, or other arbitrary factor, and
whether, considering similar cases, the penalty is excessive or dispropor-
tionate. Having madethese determinations, thecourtmay affirm the death
penalty or commute it to life imprisonment.17 The court held that Smith's
trial was conducted in strict compliance with the procedures in effect.
18
The court addressed Smith's contention that the statutory definitions
of the two statutorily provided aggravating circumstances were "so vague
as to vest the sentencing authority with standardless sentencing power."'19
As to the first aggravating circumstance, "future dangerousness," the
court found no constitutional vagueness because the statutory language is
"designed to focus the fact-finder's attention on priorcriminal conduct as
the principal predicate for a prediction of future dangerousness." 20 The
court also noted that the circumstances surrounding the commission of the
offense provide a further predicate.21 Significantly, the supreme court
focused then on violence, saying that "if the defendant has been previ-
ously convicted of 'criminal acts of violence', i.e., serious crimes against
the person committed by intentional acts of unprovoked violence,
there is a reasonable 'probability', i.e., a likelihood substantially greater
than a mere possibility, that he would commit similar crimes in the
future." 22 In later decisions, the court's focus has wandered consider-
ably.23
As to the "vileness" factor,24 involving "depravity of mind" and/or
"aggravated battery to the victim,"25 the court interpreted the words
"depravity of mind" to mean "a degree of moral turpitude and psychical
debasement surpassing that inherent in the definition of ordinary legal
malice and premeditation. '26 The court found that "aggravated battery"
meant "a battery which, qualitatively and quantitatively, is more culpable
than the minimum necessary to accomplish an act ofmurder."27 The court
maintained that these constructions would be the only constructions of
"depravity of mind" and "aggravated battery" rationally related to the
commonly accepted meanings of "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible
or inhuman."28 The court held that although it is conceivable that proof
of an intentional killing is all the pro of necessary to establish vileness, such
a construction is "strained, unnatural, and manifestly contrary to legisla-
tive intent."29 According to the court, the General Assembly did not
intend to sweep all grades of murder into the capital class.
The court noted in passing that Virginia's capital murder statute
contains a safeguard available to the defendant, a non-exclusive list of
mitigating factors. (Mitigation factors are not articulated in the approved
Texas statute, on which the Virginia statute is based, and so, may not be
constitutionally required). The court noted only that the list is illustrative
and not exclusive and that "the statute expressly provides that facts in
mitigation 'may include, but shall notbe limited to' the items codified, and
that evidence may be adduced to show 'any other facts in mitigation of the
offense."' 30 Apparently, the court believed then that a defendant could
bring anything that he wanted to the jury's attention.
Pursuant to Code § 17-110.1(E), the court then directed its attention
to the determination of whether the penalty imposed was "excessive or
disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases. t31 In aid of that
determination today, the court is empowered by statute to "accumulate the
records of all capital felony cases tried with such period of time as the court
may determine. '32 However, for the supreme court's review of Smith's
case, no record of cases involving the particular crime charged in the
indictment was available because it was the first case reviewed under the
1977 law. The court, relying on its own research of "comparable" cases,
the source of which the court did not disclose, noted that in no cases had
a penalty less than death been imposed. Ultimately, the Virginia Supreme
Court affirmed the guilty verdict and the sentence of death.
Despite an absence of prior cases on which it could rely, the Virginia
court said quite a lot that day. The court discussed the limitations of the
capital murder statute, jury qualification and exclusion, the aggravating
factors, the ability to present evidence in mitigation, and the test for
excessiveness and proportionality of the death sentence. In the thirteen
years since the court decided Smith, it has departed substantially from the
standards set forth in that decision that it has received for automatic
review33 or on appeal of right.
The Appeal: Relief Denied
Default and Waiver
Since Smith, the Virginia appellate process has not provided much
recourse for capital defendants. One of the reasons is that the default and
waiver rules allow the court to dismiss claims without judgment on the
merits for purely procedural error. Known as the contemporaneous
objection rule, Rule 5:25, in pertinent part, provides that "[e]rror will not
be sustained to any ruling of the trial court.., before which the case was
initially tried unless the objection was stated with reasonable certainty at
the time of the ruling, except for good cause shown or to enable [the
Virginia Supreme] Court to attain the ends ofjustice."34 The unfortunate
result is that the defendant is deprived of a ruling on the merits of the
defaulted claim, and the record will not contain any indication of how the
court would rule on the same issue if it were timely raised.
An assignment of error which merely states that the judgment or
award is contrary to the law and the evidence is not sufficient.35 The
purpose of Rule 5:25 is "to protect the trial court from appeals based upon
undisclosed grounds, to prevent the setting of traps on appeal, to enable the
trial judge to rule intelligently, and to avoid unnecessary reversals and
mistrials. 36 Thus, in the supreme court's opinion, strict application of the
rules tends to promote, not hinder, the administration ofjustice. Despite
the fact that "death is different," and the penalty absolute, the supreme
court has repeatedly applied the nile in death penalty cases. 37
The court has applied the exception to the contemporaneous objec-
tion rule "for good cause shown or to attain the ends ofjustice" only once.
The court reversed the capital murder conviction of the defendant in Ball
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v. Commonwealth38 because the defendant had been convicted of a crime
of which under the evidence he could notproperly be foundguilty. InBall,
the defendant was convicted of murder in the commission of robbery
while armed with a deadly weapon under Code § 18.2-31(4), which at that
time allowed conviction of capital murder only for "robbery," not "at-
tempted robbery." In the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the
evidence showed that the victim was killed during an attempted robbery,
rather than in the actual commission of a robbery. At the time, the most
that the defendant could be convicted of was felony murder under Code
§ 18.2-32. The defendant had not raised this point at trial.
Rule 5:17(c), amended in 1991, applies the provisions of Rule 5:25
to limit substantially the questions upon which the supreme court will
rule. "Only errors assigned in the petition for appeal will be noticed....
Where appeal is taken from a judgment of the Court of Appeals, only
assignments of error relating to questions presented in the Court of
Appeals and assignments of errorrelating to action of the Court of Appeals
may be included in the petition for appeal."39
The Virginia Supreme Court also will not consider assignments of
error which are waived by the defendant's failure to argue them on brief.40
Recently, in Stockton v. Commonwealth41 , the court rigorously applied
the rule. The court refused to grant the defendant's request to file a brief
in excess of a 50-page limitation set by Rule 5:26.42 Later, when the
defendant attempted to rely upon issues which he raised in assignments of
error but did not brief because of the page limitation, the court adhered to
Rule 5:27 and refused to hear the issues.
Construction and Reach of the Capital Murder Statute43
The Virginia capital murder statute enacted in 1977 is § 18.2-31 of
the Code of Virginia. Nine subsections create specific forms of capital
murder rather than a single generic form.44 This difference makes it
difficult to compare the construction of the Virginia statute with those of
other states. Nevertheless, Virginia defines what constitutes capital
murder for gradation purposes. The Assembly grades murder in order to
assign punishment consistent with prevailing societal and legal view of
what is appropriate and procedurally fair.45
The Virginia Supreme Court has held that when construing § 18.2-
31 "[p]enal statutes are to be strictly construed against the Common-
wealth and in favor of a citizen's liberty."46 The Commonwealth
cannot extend statutes by implication and must confine them to those
offenses proscribed by the language used. Therefore, every phrase of each
subsection must be examined to determine the breadth of the subsection.
Essentially, the nine subsections under § 18.2-31 all require a willful,
deliberate and premeditated killing of any person and a "gradation
element," e.g., rape or murder for hire. Unless the Commonwealth can
prove one of these gradation elements beyond a reasonable doubt in
addition to proving a willful, deliberate and premeditated killing, a
criminal defendant cannot be convicted under the capital murder statute.47
In response to judicial efforts like Ball to construe the statute
narrowly, the General Assembly periodically broadens the statute. For
example, until 1988, the rape subsection, § 18.2-31(5), referred to the
killing of "a person during the commission of, or subsequent to rape." In
1985 inHarward v. Commonwealth,4 8 the Virginia Courtdecided that this
language limited the subsection to situations in which the victim of the
homicide and the victim of the rape were the same person. The Harward
court also concluded in dictum that the phrase "during the commission of'
in the rape subsection was narrower than the phrase found in other parts
of the statute, "in the commission of .... [D]uring the commission of
excluded a killing which preceded the rape while "in the commission of'
included a killing which preceded the felony, for example, robbery. In
response, the Virginia Assembly began amending the subsection in 1988.
These amendments included changing the reference of"a person" to "any
person," 49 The amendment conformed this section to §§ 18.2-31 (1) and
-31(4), in which "any person" means that the victim of the homicide and
the victim of the underlying felony do not have to be the same person. The
1988 amendments also changed "during the commission of," to "in the
commission of." The Virginia Assembly also added "attempted rape" to
the rape subsection in 1989. In 1991, the General Assembly added § 18.2-
31(9), dealing with the manufacture and distribution of controlled sub-
stances. The 1991 amendments added "forcible sodomy or attempted
forcible sodomy" to the rape subsection. As the court's scrutiny narrowed
the scope of the existing capital murder statute, the legislature added
gradation elements.
Occasionally, the court has also expanded the scope of the capital
murder statute's sections, especially the robbery section.50 Section 18.2-
31(4) requires that the Commonwealth prove a premeditated killing of
"any person"51 and each element of common law robbery, and establish
that the defendant was armed with a deadly weapon. The common law
definition of robbery is "the taking, with the intent to deprive the owner
permanently, of personal property, from his person or in his presence,
against his will, by violence or intimidation." 52 To prove robbery, the
Commonwealth must prove that the violence or intimidation was contem-
poraneous with the taking. Then, the Commonwealth must prove that the
killing occurred "in the commission of" the taking, which was contempo-
raneous with the violence or intimidation.
Despite the precise language of the statute, the court has opened up
the time frame to include a killing and taking that are "so closely related
in time, place and causal connection as to make them parts of the same
criminal enterprise." 53 In Pope v. Commonwealth, decided before at-
tempted robbery was added to the statute, the defendant stole a purse from
a car without violence or intimidation, apparently without the victim's
knowledge, while he was a passenger. Upon exiting the car, the defendant
pulled out a gun, demanded money, and killed the victim. Only later did
a survivor notice that the purse was missing. By one view of the events,
the taking was not contemporaneous with any intimidation. However, the
court affirmed the conviction and sentence.
The court has also given the Commonwealth some freedom to prove
that the defendant was "armed with a deadly weapon." Coppola 1'.
Commonwealth,54 decided in 1987, suggests that the immediate perpetra-
tor of the crime need not be armed with a deadly weapon himself. In
Coppola, the court upheld the defendant's joint liability with a co-
defendant for the victim's death and as principals in the first degree.
However, the facts actually suggest that Coppola was not armed during the
robbery and murder. Therefore, it seems that the immediate perpetrator
of the killing need not carry, or use the deadly weapon to effectuate the
killing.55
The court has also held that the defendant does not have to be armed
prior to the commission of the underlying crime of robbery, but may seize
it at the scene to commit the killing.56 Similarly, the court has held that
the defendant may arm himselfduring the commission of the entire crime,
but after the robbery, and still satisfy the statute. In Correll v. Common-
wealth,57 the defendant argued that he had already committed the robbery
before he armed himself and killed the victim. The court, opening up the
time line, held that the robbery continued throughout the killing and that
the defendant was armed "during the commission of a portion of the
robbery." 58 The court, despite having a purely interpretive function,
legislates when it seems necessary, to reach the decisions it finds logical.
Aggravating Circumstances59
In the sentencing phase of the bifurcated capital murder trial, "[t]he
penalty of death shall not be imposed unless the Commonwealth shall
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that there is a probability based upon
evidence of the prior history of the defendant or the circumstances
surrounding the commission of the offense of which he is accused that he
would commit criminal acts ofviolence that would constitute a continuing
serious threat to society (future dangerousness), or that his conduct in
committing the offense was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or
Capital Defense Digest - Page 33
inhuman (vileness), in that it involved torture, depravity of mind, or
aggravated battery to the victim." 60 The statute lists two aggravating
factors in disjunctive terms, and the court has found them independently
sufficient to support a death sentence.
61
Evidence of Future Dangerousness
In Smith, the supreme court held that the "future dangerousness"
aggravating factor was not unconstitutionally vague in guiding sentencing
discretion. The court found this factor identical to the one in the Texas
statute approved by the U.S. Supreme Court in Jurek v. Texas. In
upholding its adequacy, the court noted that the factor was designed to
focus the jury's attention on the prior criminal record primarily, but not
exclusively. 62 Thus, as the court later explained in Peterson v. Common-
wealth63, admissible evidence of future dangerousness is not limited to the
defendant's criminal record. In Poyner v. Commonwealth, the court
allowed testimony by a victim of an unadjudicated assault and battery as
evidence of future dangerousness.64Moreover, the court also found the
content of a confession and the demeanor of the defendant during the
confession relevant to future dangerousness.
65
In recent years, the court has dispelled any notion that it should rely
primarily on prior acts of unprovoked violence to show future danger-
ousness, as it did in Smith. In Quisenberry v. Commonwealth66, decided
last term, the court held that the defendant's use of illegal drugs was
relevant to the issue of future dangerousness. In Strickler v. Common-
wealth,67 also decided last term, the court held that evidence of prior
burglary, petit larceny, tampering with a vending machine, violation of
probation and other felonies and misdemeanors was more than sufficient
to support the jury's finding of future dangerousness.
Evidence of Vileness
The supreme court has held that the jury must specifically find the
elements of torture, depravity of mind, or aggravated battery to support a
death sentence under the "vileness" factor.68 However, the court has
further defined only depravity of mind and aggravated battery. It has not
defined torture. In Smith, the court held that its constructions of "depravity
of mind" and "aggravated battery" would be the only acceptable construc-
tions.69 By the time the supreme court reviewed Clark v. Common-
wealth70, less than one year later, the court clarified that it did "not mean,
however, that those definitions [were] the best or the only ones." In Clark,
the trial court failed to define the terms "outrageously or wantonly vile",
"horrible or inhuman", "depravity of mind or aggravated battery to the
victim." The supreme court held that, although it was guided by its
definitions in Smith, it did "not necessarily follow that these particular
definitions were necessary for the jury to determine whether the conduct
of Clark was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible, or inhuman in that
it involved depravity of mind or aggravated battery."'71 Therefore, the
supreme court has kept its vague definitions of the elements of the
1.vileness" factor and left the legal question of exactly what those terms
mean to the unbridled discretion of the jury.
To that end, the Virginia Supreme Court has not decided whether
proof of an aggravated battery requires serious injury before death. In
Bunch v. Commonwealth72, the court held that if a jury could find that
death did not occur until after some form of abuse, the jury can find
aggravated battery. Therefore, by implication, the jury does not have to
find absolutely that the victim was alive for the additional abuse. "For the
purposes of the 'vileness' determination, it is immaterial whether the
decedent remained conscious during the course of several assaults.
'73
The court held in Poyner v. Commoniwealth74 that psychological
torture adequately reflects depravity of mind. Therefore, execution-style
murders, typically characterized by a single, fatal shot to the head, could
fulfill the "vileness" factor.75 Further, mutilation or sexual assault
committed upon a corpse or unconscious body has been held to demon-
strate the defendant's depravity of mind.
76
Mitigation Evidence
Section 18.2-31 of the Virginia Code permits the defendant to
introduce any evidence relevant to the penalty decision, including the
circumstances surrounding the offense, the history and background of the
defendant, and any other facts in mitigation of the offense.77 The statute
provides a list of mitigating circumstances which is illustrative but not
exclusive. However, the Virginia Supreme Court has admitted and
excluded mitigation evidence on an unclear, possibly inconsistent basis.
Forexample, in Coppola v. Virginia, the court admitted evidence of a good
prior record, and extenuating circumstances tending to explain the
defendant's commission of the crime as relevant to determining whether
the defendant would probably be a continuing serious threat to society, or
whether his conduct in committing the murder was outrageously or
wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman. 78 In Mackall v. Commonwealth,
79
however, the court found no abuse of discretion in the trial court's refusal
to admit into evidence at the penalty trial the statement of the defendant's
former probation officer that the defendant did not want to be sent to the
proposed prison because he realized that he had too many friends "from
the wrong group" there and would likely be swayed by this bad influence.
The trial court excluded this evidence in mitigation on the grounds of
relevance.
Relief Granted on Appeal
The Virginia Supreme Court rarely reverses sentences of death, and
not all grants of relief are final. The court has reversed approximately
seven times out of over 75 cases it has heard. Nevertheless, an analysis of
the court's reasons for reversing a capital murder conviction may prove
helpful to Virginia defense attorneys.
In Johnson v. Commonwealth,80 the court reversed the defendant's
conviction of capital murder under the robbery subsection. The
supreme court determined that the trial court misapplied the law
dealing with principals in the first and second degree as that subject
relates to capital murder. Code § 18.2-18, known as the "triggerman
rule," provides that "except in the case of a killing for hire under the
provisions of § 18.2-31 an accessory before the fact or principal in
the second degree to a capital murder shall be indicted, tried,
convicted and punished as though the offense were murder in the
first degree." 81 Therefore, when the offense constituting the charge
of capital murder is the wilful, deliberate and premeditated killing of
a person in the commission of robbery while armed with a deadly
weapon, only the actual perpetrator of the crime may be convicted of
the capital murder. "Thus, in order to convict [the] defendant, the jury
was required to find that he actually fired the fatal shot."
'82
In ruling on jury instructions, the trial judge stated erroneously that
he believed "that if two persons acting in concert previously planned to
commit [r]obbery and [m]urder, committed the robbery and murder, then
each would be guilty as a principal in the first degree. '83 As a result of this
ruling the prosecutors asserted that the defendant could be found guilty of
capital murder on two theories: first, as the actual triggerman; and second,
if thejury found that in the execution of a robbery by the two co-defendants
the victim was killed by either, the jury could convict the defendant
"regardless of who pulled the trigger." 84
The supreme court held that the inadequacy of the jury instructions
as to the law of principal in the first degree as applied to capital murder,
combined with the Commonwealth's erroneous arguments constituted
harmful, reversible error. Upon remand, Johnson was again convicted of
capital murder. In 1981, the Virginia Supreme Court affirmed his re-
conviction for capital murder and sentence to life imprisonment.
85
The "triggerman rule" still stands as one of the most important and
oft-used principles by Virginia defense counsel when there are co-
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defendants to a capital murder charge. In 1991, in Strickler v. Common-
wealth86, the court held for only the second time87 that ajoint participation
theory could be sufficient to convict a defendant of capital murder
pursuant to the robbery subsection. In Strickler, the co-defendants killed
the victim by repeatedly dropping an 69-pound rock on her head. The
court determined that both defendants had to have been involved in
holding her and dropping the rock. The court held that"where two ormore
persons take a direct participation in inflicting fatal injuries, each joint
participant is an 'immediate perpetrator' for the purpose of the capital
murder statute."88
In 1980, the supreme court reversed the capital murder conviction
and death sentence of Buddy Earl Justus and remanded the case for a new
trial in Justus v. Commonwealth.89 The defendant had been convicted
under the rape subsection, § 18.2-31(5). The supreme court held that the
trial court improperly failed to strike from the venire for cause a prospec-
tive juror who could not stand impartial and free from prejudice as to the
defendant's guilt.90 The juror responded affirmatively to the question
posed by the defense counsel, "[d]o you believe that [the victim] was raped
by Mr. Justus?" She also answered yes to the question, "would it take
evidence.., to... change that opinion?"91 The court held that it was not
relevant to its decision that the defendant ultimately used one of his
peremptory strikes to remove the juror from the panel and the conviction
and sentence were determined by ajury which did not include the removed
juror.
92
Jury qualification is a confusing, important battleground for capital
murder defense counsel. In Justus, the supreme court relied on Breeden
v. Commonwealth,93 a non-capital case in which the court had observed
that the right of an accused to an impartial jury is a constitutional right,9 4
reinforced in Virginia by legislative mandate95 and by the Rules of the
supreme court. 96 The court held that any reasonable doubt whether a
venireman stands indifferent in the cause must be resolved in favor of the
accused.97 The Justus supreme court did not rely on the Witherspoon98
test used in Smith to determine the juror's qualification. The question was
not whether the prospective juror was "irrevocably committed" against
the death penalty but rather the most basic test for juror qualification:
impartiality. On remand, the jury again convicted Justus of capital murder
and recommended the death sentence. Thejudge, who presided at the first
trial, imposed this sentence.99
In Martin v. Commonwealth in 1981,100 the supreme court reversed
the conviction and sentence of a defendant on grounds of prejudicial error
in the jury selection process. The trial court refused to exclude for cause
avenireman who expressed the beliefduringvoir dire that the accused had
to prove his innocence. During attempts to rehabilitate, the juror said she
understood that the burden rests with the state to prove the case beyond a
reasonable doubt and that there is no burden on the defendant to prove
anything.101 The trial court overruled defense counsel's objections to the
juror's placement on the jury. Ultimately, the defense exercised a
peremptory challenge to exclude her from the jury, so the conviction and
sentence were determined by ajury which did not include the challenged
juror.
The supreme court held that with respect to the "crucial question"
whether the accused had to prove his innocence, the juror's affirmative
response "was not so much a symptom of her ignorance of the law as a
candid reflection of the state of her mind concerning [the defendant's]
guilt."'1 02 The courtheld that proof that aprospectivejuror is impartial and
fair "should come from him and not be based on his mere assent to
persuasive suggestions."'
10 3
In Frye v. Commonwealth104 in 1986, the court vacated the death
sentence and remanded the case for further proceedings only on the issue
of penalty.' 05 The court determined that the Commonwealth's closing
arguments at the sentencing trial, which tended to lead the jury to believe
that the sentencing responsibility lay with the court and not itself, were
improper. The Commonwealth, in an effort to diminish the impact of the
defense's closing argument, in which counsel had repeatedly told the jury
that it was being asked to "kill this boy," informed the jury that the
responsibility was not theirs: "The [j]udge will be the person that fixes
sentence if you find the defendant guilty as charged and fix his punishment
at death. The [c]ourt will pronounce sentence."
106
The courtrelied on a United States Supreme Court decision, Caldwell
v. Mississippi,107 which also involved improper argument by a prosecutor
in a capital sentencing proceeding. The United States Supreme Court held
that the effort to minimize the jury's sense of responsibility for imposing
a sentence of death violated the eighth amendment's heightened "need for
reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate punish-
ment."108 The United States Supreme Court also found that unreliability
and bias inhere in death sentences following "state-induced suggestions
that the sentencing jury may shift its sense of responsibility to an appellate
court."
109
The Virginia Supreme Court also relied on the Virginia statutory
sentencing scheme and state case law to support the vacation of the
sentence. Under the sentencing scheme, it is the jury's responsibility to
"fix" the punishment of a defendant convicted of a capital offense, and it
is the court's responsibility to "impose" sentence. 110 Although the
sentencing statute twice refers to the jury's verdict as a "recommenda-
tion,""I in practice, the court must either impose sentence in accordance
with the verdict fixing punishment at death or set aside the death sentence
and impose the lesser penalty of life imprisonment.11 2 Therefore, in
criminal actions in the Commonwealth, the jury has the power to deter-
mine punishment of one convicted of a crime unless the case is tried
without a jury.113 The Frye court acknowledged that the jury's role has
long been construed to be more than advisory, resulting in more than just
a recommendation of punishment." 4 Finally, the Frye court stated that
it had already established that it was improper for a prosecutor to tell the
jury that, if it makes a mistake, the court can correct it.15
In 1990, the supreme court reversed the capital murder conviction
and the death sentence of Dung Quang Cheng in Cheng v. Common-
wealth. 1 16 A Circuit Court jury convicted the defendant of capital murder
pursuant to Virginia Code § 18.2-31(1) and § 18.2-31(4), abduction,
robbery, conspiracy to commit abduction, robbery or murder, use of a
firearm in the commission of robbery, abduction or murder; and posses-
sion of a sawed-off shotgun." 7 The supreme court held that there was
insufficient evidence to show that Cheng was, in fact, the triggerman. As
mentioned above in relation to Johnson and Strickler, except in the case
of murder-for-hire, the death eligible class of murderers is limited to the
actual perpetrator or joint perpetrators who actually cause death. The
court noted that while the evidence and the defendant's confession could
lead to the reasonable inference that Cheng was the triggerman, a mere
probability orsuspicion ofthe defendant's guiltwas insufficientto support
a conviction. The court remanded the case for a new trial on a charge no
greater than first degree murder.
Automatic Review
Section 17-110.1 of the Virginia Code provides that the supreme
court "shall consider and determine ... whether the sentence of death is
excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases,
considering both the crime and the defendant." The court also "shall
consider and determine.. .[w]hether the sentence of death was imposed
under the influence of passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary factor."
Proportionality Review
Proportionality review by an appellate court is statutorily-required in
Virginia. Virginia Code § 17-110.1(C) requires the supreme court to
review the death sentence on the record to consider and determine: "1.
[w]hether the sentence of death was imposed under the influence of
passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary factor; and 2. [w]hether the
sentence of death is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed
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in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant." In
response, the court accumulates the records of all capital murder cases
reviewed by the court pursuant to Code § 17-110.1(E). 118  In con-
ducting the proportionality review, the court takes particular note of the
facts in those cases in which juries imposed capital punishment on the
basis of the same predicate factors as did the jury in the case being
reviewed. 119 In determining whether a sentence of death is excessive or
disproportionate, the supreme court inquires whetherjuries in thejurisdic-
tion generally approve the death penalty for comparable or similar
crimes. 120 The Virginia Supreme Court has never reversed a sentence on
the basis of disproportionality.
Although the Virginia statute requires proportionality review, the
United States Constitution does not.12 1 In 1984, the United States
Supreme Court held in Pulley v. Harris122 that the eighth amendment does
not require states to compare the sentence in the case before it with the
penalties imposed in similar cases. 12 3 In Pulley, the Court examined the
case of a defendant sentenced to death under California's capital murder
statute. The defendant claimed that the California capital punishment
statute was invalid under the United States Constitution because it failed
to require the California Supreme Court to compare the defendant's
sentence with the sentences imposed in similar capital cases.
124
In denying the defendant relief, the Court discussed the difference
between "traditional" proportionality and the proportionality review
sought by Harris, and provided for in numerous state statutes, including
Virginia's. The Court decided that traditional proportionality refers to an
"abstract evaluation of the appropriateness of a sentence for a particular
crime." 125 The Court acknowledged that it has occasionally struck down
punishment as "inherently disproportionate, and therefore cruel and
unusual, when imposed for a particular crime or category of crime."
126
The Court noted several criteria that were important to the proportionality
review it imposed: "the gravity of the offense and the severity of the
penalty", "sentences imposed forothercrimes", and "sentencingpractices
in other jurisdictions". 127 Contrasting this traditional proportionality
review to that provided for in numerous state statutes, including Georgia
specifically and presumably Virginia, the Court decided that this propor-
tionality review "presumes that the death sentence is not disproportionate
to the crime in the traditional sense. It purports to inquire instead whether
the penalty is nonetheless unacceptable in a particular because [it is)
disproportionate to the punishment imposed on others convicted of the
same crime."128 The Court held that this proportionality review is not a
constitutional requirement and "that some schemes providing proportion-
ality review are constitutional does notmean that such review is indispens-
able."
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A Comparison to Texas
In Texas, a defendant is death eligible if he "intentionally or
knowingly causes the death of an individual" 130 and he satisfies any one
of six additional predicates as follows:
(1) the person murders a peace officer or fireman who is acting in the
lawful discharge of an official duty and who the person knows is a peace
officer or fireman;
(2) the person intentionally commits the murder in the occurs of
committing or attempting to commit kidnapping, burglary, robbery,
aggravated sexual assault, or arson;
(3) the person commits the murder for remuneration or the promise of
remuneration or employs another to commit the murder for remuneration
or the promise of remuneration;
(4) the person commits the murder while escaping or attempting to escape
from a penal institution;
(5) the person, while incarcerated in a penal institution, murders another
who is employed in the operation of the penal institution; or
(6) the person murders more than one person:
(A) during the same criminal transaction; or
(B) during different criminal transactions but the murders are committed
pursuant to the same scheme or course of conduct.
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The statutory requirements are somewhat similar to those in Virginia.
However, under Virginia law, the killing must be "willful, deliberate, and
premeditated" and under the Texas statute a defendant arguably could be
found guilty of capital murder for less than an "intentional" killing except
under § 19.03(a)(2).
Then, in the sentencing phase of the bifurcated trial in Texas, the two
states go their procedural separate ways. In Texas, the jury is asked to
respond to three questions that guide its discretion to sentence a defendant
to mandatory death or life imprisonment underTexas Penal Code § 12.31.
The jury must find beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) the actor killed
intentionally or knowingly; (2) he will probably commit other acts of
violence if not executed; and (3) the killing was unreasonable in response
to the provocation, if any, of the deceased.1 32 The jury may not answer
"yes" to any of the questions unless it agrees unanimously 133 and if the
jury returns a negative finding on any issue submitted, the court shall
sentence the defendant to life imprisonment.134 However, if the jury
answers "yes" to each of the questions, it must sentence the defendant to
death. 135 Under Virginia law, even if the jury finds the defendant guilty
of capital murder and finds both aggravating factors, it may still sentence
the defendant to life imprisonment.
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has direct appeal jurisdiction
in death penalty cases in Texas. Under the Texas capital murder statute,
upon which the Virginia statute is modeled, the Texas courts have
sentenced more defendants to death than any other system in the United
States.
A principal difference in conviction rates may be that under Texas
law, "[a]ll traditional distinctions between accomplices and principals are
abolished by [§ 7.01] and each party to an offense may be charged and
convicted without alleging that he acted as a principal or accomplice."'
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In Texas, a defendant may be convicted of capital murder for the actions
of another. The law of accomplice liability of §§ 7.01 and 7.02 is
applicable to capital murder cases in Texas. 137 However, while the law
of parties can apply to convict an accused of capital murder, the death
penalty may be imposed only by examination of the mitigating and
aggravatingcircumstances concerning the individual defendant.138 There-
fore, while a defendant may be found guilty of capital murder on the basis
of another's actions, he must be sentenced on the basis of his own actions.
However, the Texas court has been able to sustain the death penalty given
to someone other than the triggerman, so any distinction is probably
lost. 139
Occasionally, the Texas court has construed the statute strictly. For
example, the court held in White v. State,140 a 1989 case of intentional
murder in the course of committing robbery under § 19.03(a)(2), that the
point at which the defendant formulated his intent to take the victim's
property was critical in differentiating between the defendant's commis-
sion of capital murder in the course of robbery and his commission of first-
degree murder, followed by theft from a corpse, a third-degree felony in
Texas.
However, in Gentry v. State141 , decided ayearearlier, the factthat the
victim was murdered prior to being robbed did not invalidate the intent to
steal, for purposes of murder in the course of committing robbery. In
Virginia, the supreme court has also decided that there is really no
distinction. 142 In Virginia, the killing may occur before, during, or after
the taking in Yirginia where robbery is used as the predicate offense.
143
In Barefoot v. State144 in 1980, the Court of Criminal Appeals of
Texas held that the trial court did not err by permitting psychiatrists who
hadneverpersonally examined the defendant to testify as to the defendant's
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future dangerousness. In Barefoot, the State gave the doctors a hypotheti-
cal fact situation based on the evidence in the case at hand and asked if the
individual described in the hypothetical question would probably commit
future acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to
society. 145
Conclusions
Since Smith, almost thirteen years ago, the the Virginia Supreme
Court has departed from the course plotted during that first review of a
capital murder case. Despite the fact that the Commonwealth must at least
one aggravating factor to support a sentence of death, the court has failed
to narrow the definition or application of the "vileness" factor as evi-
denced in Clark and Poyner. And it has never provided a definition of
torture. It has broadly interpreted the scope of evidence relevant to future
dangerousness, admitting a wide range of non-violent criminal activity
and unadjudicated acts, rather than relying principally on a violent
criminal record.
The court has broadly construed the construction and reach of the
statute, especially the crime of murder in the commission of robbery. Only
rarely has the court strictly construed the statute as it did in Ball v.
Commonwealth, where the court could not find the defendant guilty of
murder "in the commission of robbery" because the victim was killed
during an attempted robbery.
The supreme court has waived the default rules only once, also in
Ball, and then only in conjunction with its strict construction of the statute.
Only when the defendant had been convicted under a subsection that he
could not have possibly violated, even when the evidence was taken in the
light most favorable to the Commonwealth, did the court allow some
flexibility. It has not been flexible with the default rule despite the fact that
the court has the discretion to hear cases in the interest of justice.
The court, not surprisingly, has never found error in a penalty trial.
Nor has the court ever reversed on automatic review of the sentence.
Capital voir dire has some unique problems. The current standard in
Virginia for removal of a prospective jury member is whether or not the
views of thejuror would "prevent or substantially impair the performance
of his duties as ajuror in accordance with his instructions and his oath." 146
This standard is arguably adverse to defense counsel and it is certainly
tougher to exclude a juror for cause under this standard than under the
Witherspoon standard of "irrevocable commitment" used in Smith, thir-
teen years ago.
The courts have also restricted voir dire. In Mackall, the court
concluded that counsel could ask whether the juror had views on the
propriety of the death penalty but could not inquire into what those views
were. 147 Similarly, the court held in Mu'Min v. Commonwealth148 that
while defense counsel may ask a prospective juror whether he has
acquired information before trial, it does not follow that the defendants
have a right to know what that information is.
The court held inEaton v. Commonwealth 149 in 1990 that thejury has
no right to information concerning postsentencing events. The court
excluded a voir dire question which would have informed thejury that the
defendant would not have been eligible for parole if sentenced to life
imprisonment. In Eaton, because the jury sentenced the defendant to
death based on his future dangerousness, parole ineligibility was relevant
to the reality of this situation.
In the last thirteen years, the Virginia Supreme Court has, with a very
few exceptions, affirmed capital murder convictions and death sentences.
Accordingly, defense counsel faced with tactical choices between matters
that might succeed at trial and reliance on appellate issues would be well
advised to place emphasis and effort on avoiding capital murder convic-
tions and death sentences at trial or before.
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